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Abstract: In the Kaizo articles, written be-
tween 1922 and 1924, Husserl drew on the 
intercultural relationship between Europe and 
non-Europe. The viewpoints he held in these 
articles do not deviate much from that in the 
Vienna lecture 1935, which is later included in 
Crisis. It is in the latter that Husserl delineates 
systematically what he thinks of the idea of 
Europe and what makes Europe different from 
the other parts of the world. Notably, these 
viewpoints were already disclosed in the Kaizo 
articles, though in very different contexts. As is 
well known, the background of Crisis is the 
concern about the modern science which devi-
ates more and more from the concrete life-
world, whereas the Kaizo articles focus mainly 
on the ethical problems. Nevertheless both of 
them touch on the cultural as well as intercul-
tural problematic, that Husserl deals with more 
and more intensively in his late philosophy. My 
essay will discuss the following questions: On 
what grounds does Husserl think that the phi-
losophical rationality of Europe deserves being 
recommended to other cultures? How does he 
come to this conclusion in his discourse on 
ethics? In order to come to terms with these 
questions I will unfold my essay in three steps: 
first, I will sketch how Husserl understands 
ethics; secondly, explain the connection be-
tween ethics and philosophical rationality, and 
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Resumen: En los artículos de Kaizo, escritos 
entre 1922 y 1924, Husserl se centró en la 
relación intercultural entre Europa y no-Europa. 
Los puntos de vista que él expresó en esos 
artículos no se desvían mucho del de la confe-
rencia de Viena de 1935, que más tarde se 
incluiría en La crisis. Es en el último en el que 
Husserl esboza sistemáticamente lo que piensa 
de Europa y lo que la hace diferente de otras 
partes del mundo. Estos puntos de vista ya 
aparecían especialmente en los artículos de 
Kaizo, aunque en contextos muy diferentes. 
Como es bien sabido, el fondo de La crisis es la 
preocupación acerca de la ciencia moderna que 
se desvía cada vez más del mundo de la vida 
concreto, mientras que los artículos de Kaizo se 
centran principalmente en los problemas éticos. 
Sin embargo, ambos aluden a la problemática 
tanto cultural como intercultural  a la que Hus-
serl dedica cada vez más atención en su filosof-
ía posterior. Mi artículo tratará los siguientes 
temas: ¿En qué se basa Husserl para creer que 
la  racionalidad filosófica de Europa merece ser 
recomendada a otras culturas? ¿Cómo llega a 
esta conclusión en el discurso sobre la ética? 
Para aceptar estas preguntas desarrollaré el 
artículo en tres pasos: en primer lugar, esbo-
zaré cómo Husserl entiende la ética; en segun-
do lugar, explicaré la conexión entre la ética y 
la racionalidad filosófica, y en tercer lugar 
hablaré de cómo estos pensamientos éticos 
tiene relevancia intercultural. 
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he held in these articles do not differ much from those in the Vienna lecture 
1935, which is later included in Crisis1. It is in the latter that Husserl delineates 
systematically what he thinks of the idea of Europe and what makes Europe 
different from the other parts of the world. Notably these viewpoints were al-
ready disclosed in the Kaizo articles, though in very different contexts. As is 
well known, the background of Crisis is the concern about modern science, 
which deviates more and more from the concrete lifeworld, whereas the Kaizo 
articles focus mainly on the ethical problems. Nevertheless both of them touch 
on the cultural as well as intercultural problematic that Husserl deals with more 
and more intensively in his late philosophy.  
Husserl deals with the Europe/non-Europe issue in two distinct ways, the 
one in the context of modern science and the other in an ethical context. The 
second way of Husserl’s dealing with Europe/non-Europe issue will be the focal 
point of my present essay. The questions to be discussed include: On what 
grounds does Husserl think that the philosophical rationality of Europe deserves 
being recommended to other cultures? How he comes to this conclusion in his 
discourse on ethics? In order to come to terms with these questions I will de-
velop my paper in three steps: I will first sketch how Husserl understands eth-
ics; secondly, explain the connection between ethics and philosophical rational-
ity; and thirdly, show how these ethical thoughts have intercultural relevance. 
 
 
1. HUSSERL ON ETHICS AND RENEWAL 
 
The way Husserl deals with the problem of renewal, which the Japanese 
term Kaizo designates, is focused on ethics, but nevertheless refers to the di-
mension of culture. In brief, one can say that on the individual level, renewal is 
related to the elevation of humanity, which Husserl considers to be the core 
problem of ethics, whereas on the collective level, it is the elevation of the cul-
ture that one is concerned with. The elevation needs to be done through the 
introduction of philosophy, which Husserl renders as rigorous science. It is in 
this way that Husserl responds to the cultural crisis that resulted from the First 
 
 
1 Ernst W. Orth, “Interkulturalität und Inter-Intentionalität: zur Husserls Ethos der Erneuerung in 
seinen japanischen Kaizo Artikeln”, Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 47 (1993), p. 334. 
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World War. It is philosophical rationality that Husserl calls on in order to deal 
with such a crisis. Rationality, which is the precious heritage from ancient 
Greece, provides the European with a helpful way to go through that crisis of 
culture, but also deserves being recommended to other cultures such as Japan. 
The invitation by the journal of Kaizo to write these articles can be regarded as 
a motivation for Husserl to think over the value problem systematically, but 
actually the ethical and practical as well as cultural problem on individual and 
the collective level had become Husserl’s concerns during the years immedi-
ately after the First World War2. 
Husserl depicts the renewal as ethical problem. Why is renewal so closely 
related to ethics? As long as renewal denotes transformation, what is the direc-
tion of such a transformation? Why is it necessary to make such a transforma-
tion? Wherein lies the value of such a transformation? What role does ethics 
play in such a context? These are questions that need to be discerned first. 
The people living in the natural attitude do not reflect much on their own 
actions and way of living. They lead their lives no other than for the sake of 
pragmatic requirements. Their living follows certain determinations and 
rhythms, not only laws of nature, but also socio-cultural regulations. What do 
they have to do or not to do depend mainly on their context of rules. Whether 
their mode of living follows the demand of reason is not their main concern. 
Ethics deals with the human behavior, particularly that which concerns moral-
ity. If it focuses on what norms people actually follow, regardless whether these 
norms are justifiable or not, whether these norms are based on necessity, then 
such ethics would be named “empirical-human ethics” (empirisch-humane 
Ethik). Ethics of this sort is concerned with how people live according to certain 
norms, how they accept the validity of these norms3. Such an ethics is not de-
void of value, yet it is not what Husserl has in mind when he calls for a study of 
the universal, apriori aspects of ethical norms. What one needs to pay more 
attention to is what he calls the science of practical reason (Wissenschaft von 
der praktischen Vemunft)4. 
 
 
2 H. Reiner Sepp/ Thomas Nenon, “Einleitung des Herausgebers”, in Aufsätze und Vorträge 1922-
1937 (Hua XXVII), Hans Reiner Sepp/Thomas Nenon (Hrsg.), p. xi. 
3 Hua XXVII, p. 20. La sigla corresponde, con indicación de tomo y página, a Edmund Husserl, Ge-
sammelte Werke-Husserliana, Vol. XXVII, Dordrecht, Springer, 1988. 
4 Ibidem, p. 21. 
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Husserl holds that leading a life based on the best knowledge and con-
science is what one should absolutely do5. But how can one achieve such a 
mode of living? The crucial point is reflection and rational thinking. Reflection 
signifies that one does not just carry on his life naively; instead he evaluates 
what he does, whether the goal is meaningfully achieved and how he feels dur-
ing the process of all his efforts. It is an ability to review his own mode of life 
and all kinds of behavior. In Husserl’s view, reason can best disclose itself not 
otherwise than in the activity of reflection. The more one can reflect on his 
whole life, the more he can actualize the rational form of life6.  
Reflection and the ensuing rational thinking make a person keenly aware of 
what he should do and what he should not. How can one act according to the 
best knowledge and conscience? This question is understood by Husserl as no 
other than the question: What categorical imperative one imposes upon him-
self. The content of the categorical imperative is “to lead a life based on practi-
cal reason”7. A life is completely justifiable as long as one’s life is based on 
practical reason. It is also the way that one becomes a genuine person (wahrer 
Mensch), that is, a person who follows the demands of absolute reason. For 
Husserl, only the one who takes care of his life according to practical reason 
can be seen to be “ethical person” (ethischer Mensch), which means nothing 
other than a genuine person. 
To sum up, the ethical question is relevant to the question of how to be-
come a person who represents true humanity. This is also what Kaizo, renewal, 
means to express verbally. For a person to transform from a lower status to the 
higher is a big issue. The transformation is disclosed by way of ethical dimen-
sion, through the way that one is leading his life in accordance with practical 
reason. Conversely, one may also say that the ethical life is the life guided by 
the idea of renewal. Both ethics and renewal are very closely related in 
Husserl’s view. 
Furthermore, compared to all the other vocational modes of life, the ethical 
form of life is viewed by Husserl as the most valuable. It is even the only mode 
of life that has  absolute value. Taking the artist as example, Husserl points out 
that the artist cannot be regarded as representing the true humanity in the 
 
 
5 Ibidem, p. 33. 
6 Ibidem, p. 35. 
7 Ibidem, p. 36. 
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highest degree. Only by adding the ethical dimension can the artist be seen to 
be so, because no other mode of life can possess the highest, that is, the uni-
versal and absolute evaluation than the ethical life8. 
As a result, the ethical life is a life beginning with the willingness to under-
take renewal, and such willingness has to be carried out over and over. Only 
out of freedom, that is, willingness of one’s own, can one grasp true humanity 
and subsequently also happiness. This is also called by Husserl Urstiftung. 
According to Husserl, all the activities of an individual constitute the cultural 
field of this person. Any individual is both the subject and object of culture. Be-
ing a cultural object means that the person is modified by the culture, no mat-
ter whether he is unconsciously modified or consciously co-constituted with 
practical reason, it is apparent that he cannot absolutely avoid being modified. 
But this is not the only relation between culture and the person. The individual 
can be seen to become the subject of culture. Through the original Urstiftung, 
he can transform himself completely into a new person. In this sense, Husserl 
calls the person with the true humanity “causa sui”, that is, self-caused. Only 
thus can he be seen to make the true renewal. In this context Husserl ex-
presses emphatically that a forced renewal would be deprived of all values. 
Only the renewal from freedom, out of one’s own willingness, can be seen to 
reach the true humanity and is also the only way to get happiness9. 
After dealing with the ethics on the individual level, Husserl moves on to 
handle ethics on the collective level. As mentioned above, people do not only 
live in the natural environment, but also in social milieu. Under such circum-
stances, one has the tendency to pursue not only the good for himself, but also 
the good of others. He wishes to see that other persons may also lead their 
lives in accordance with morality. Beyond that, he also desires his own commu-
nity to be ethical. In Husserl’s own words, the true person likes to see his 
community to be true community, he wishes that he is a member of such a 
community10. In sum, the individual good is not at all the end of his ethics, only 
the collective good can truly meet this requirement.   
Conversely, as long as all people have to live in historically cultural envi-
ronment, the impact of the latter on the former is indispensible. The collective 
 
 
8 Ibidem, p. 29. 
9 Ibidem, p. 43. 
10 Ibidem, p. 46. 
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ethics will influence the individual ethics unavoidably. Accordingly, the en-
hancement of the collective ethics in terms of evaluation will help enhance the 
individual ethics. There is interplay between the individuality and collectivity in 
respect of ethics. This is the reason why Husserl deals with the collective ethics 
as the next step to the individual ethics. On the collective level of ethics, the 
cultural problem is involved. The enhancement of collective ethics becomes no 
otherwise than the enhancement of culture. Yet, how to enhance culture? 
Wherein lies the crucial point? In order to deal with these questions, Husserl 
moves on to explore the ethical science (ethische Wissenschaft) as well as sci-
ence in general. 
 
 
2. ETHICS AND PHILOSOPHICAL RATIONALITY 
 
First of all, Husserl points out that the discourse above already has scien-
tific implications. All the ethical problems fall under scientific research. In this 
context, Husserl does not clearly distinguish between science (Wissenschaft), 
ethical science (ethische Wissenschaft), and scientific ethics (wissenschaftliche 
Ethik). I will conceptualize his science as the rigorous science (strenge Wissen-
schaft), which is what Husserl understands philosophy to be. Therefore when 
we talk about the ethical science or scientific ethics, we may conceive of it di-
rectly as philosophical ethics. 
The philosophical ethics aims not only at the understanding of the idea of 
person, the construction of notions such as environing world as well as the clas-
sification of diverse ethical manifestations, but also the normalization of life and 
the working out of the idea of norms. In other words, the enterprise of philoso-
phical ethics involves two distinct dimensions: the theoretical and the practi-
cal11. 
The value of theory is unquestionable. Husserl has confirmed this point over 
and over; even in ethics the value of theory is not diminished. He thinks that 
even in the ethical interests the valuable life nevertheless relies on developing 
the theoretical interest12. However, as long as praxis is indispensible in ethics, 
 
 
11 Marcus Brainard, “For a New World: on the practical impulse of Husserlian Theory”, Husserl Stud-
ies 23 (2007), p. 17f. 
12 Hua XXVII, p. 52. 
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the rigorous science must turn into technical science for the sake of application 
and for the sake of realizing the true humanity13. The lower value needs to de-
velop to the higher level, the passive life needs to become the active one. It is 
by way of handling these questions that the philosophical ethics has contributed 
to developing the true humanity. 
This is the case not only in the dimension of the individual, but also in the 
dimension of the collective. It is related to the question of how a community 
can become a genuinely ethical community, i.e., a community of reason (Ver-
nunftgemeinschaft). Husserl considers the role of philosophers in a society to 
be crucial in this context. It depends on whether the philosopher has a position 
of authority in the society, because philosophy is regarded by Husserl to be the 
medium for the enhancement of a society to the higher form of rationality. Phi-
losophy helps create the absolute value and such creation itself is part of the 
absolute life.  
This is the case not only on the individual level, but also on the collective 
level. Philosophers incorporate the organ how a society is conscious of itself. If 
a society allows the possibility for philosophy to unfold itself, if the philosophers 
are so respected to be able to develop philosophy as a cultural system, than 
the community is on the move to becoming a genuine community of reason. 
This is exactly what happened in ancient Greece, where philosophers succeeded 
in struggle for a social status in the community dominated by traditional at-
mosphere of religion. For Husserl the authority of religion is completely incom-
parable to that of philosophy. The authority of philosophy is not born of tradi-
tional heritage; rather it is created over and over. Philosophy counts as the field 
of ideally objective values (ein eigenes Reich idealer objektiver Werte)14. 
Put differently, by way of creating the ethical community or the community 
of reason philosophy makes enormous contributions to the community. Besides 
the individual level the collective level also stays in constant struggle with ethi-
cal progress. For the sake of development, such a struggle is absolutely indis-
pensible. What Husserl designates as collectivity includes not only the separate 
nations or peoples, but also the whole planet. Letting the whole world be united 
under the one-culture-unit can be said to be the ultimate ideal for Husserl. Un-
 
 
13 Ibidem, p. 55. 
14 Ibidem, p. 53. 
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der such circumstances one can understand why Husserl recommends his ethi-
cal thinking to a leading country such as Japan. 
 
 
3. INTERCULTURAL RELEVANCE IN HUSSERL’S ETHICAL THOUGHTS 
 
E. W. Orth mentions that Husserl’s ethical thoughts revealed in the Kaizo 
articles have the undertone of Eurocentrism, which might embarrass the con-
temporary readers more or less. Moreover, Orth also points out that the ethical 
thought of Husserl has become a common heritage for both European and non-
European such that the contemporary European are no longer privileged to hold 
the ethical superiority over the non-European15. Orth does not justify his claim 
that Husserl’s ethical thoughts are already shared by the non-Europeans, nor 
does he reflect deeply on the Eurocentric position of Husserl. The embarrass-
ment is taken up very seriously by those who strongly reject Husserl’s idea of 
one world. Anthony J. Steinbock understands Husserl’s one world as disguised 
expansion of the European homeworld and points out that the idea of one world 
can be conceived in two ways. On the one hand, “the one world is regarded 
statically as a substratum or a totality of which the home and the alien are just 
different interpretations or perspectival adumbrations”16. On the other hand, he 
proposes to grasp the one world genetically. In this case “the one world is said 
to evolve practically through expansion as the one ‘homeworld’ of a higher or-
der, making the alien familiar. […] As a result, the one world is often conceived 
as a total rational synthesis of actual and possible homeworlds of lower or-
der”17. The reason why Steinbock rejects the idea of one world in Husserl is 
that as long as homework and alienworld are co-constitutive, the one world 
which encompasses all possible alienworlds would automatically abolish the 
meaning of homeworld. In such a case, it would lead to absurd consequence 
that no one can be said to live in his homeworld genuinely. Even if it is logically 
possible, it is not at all desirable. In Steinbock’s conception, Husserl’s renewal 
of ethics should not set up the idea of one world as his ultimate goal. Rather, it 
 
 
15 Ernst W. Orth, op. cit., p. 334. 
16 Anthony J. Steinbock, “The Project of Ethical Renewal and Critique: Edmund Husserl’s Early Phe-
nomenology of Culture”, Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXXII (1994), p. 459.  
17 Idem. 
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is more crucial to stress the responsibility of every homeworld for all alien-
worlds. 
Zachary Davis purports to express a similar critique on Husserl that the 
idea of the single unified world is unnecessary result of the renewal. With help 
of the concept of sympathy, which Husserl developed almost at the same time 
as he sketched the Kaizo articles, Davis believes himself able to reinterpret the 
meaning of one world in a significant way. The solidarity between different 
homeworlds instead of totalization from one center is more endorsed by him in 
regard to what Husserl signifies as one unified world18. 
Husserl’s remarks on intercultural issues result in a dilemma for the non-
European phenomenologists. Let us limit the scope to ethics and express the 
dilemma as such: Should they insist on denying the Eurocentric position, they 
may tend to reject Husserlian project of ethics as a whole. Should they tend to 
accept the project of Husserl, they may have to put up with Eurocentrism more 
or less. Wherein lies the way out of such a dilemma? 
Suggestions have been made that Europe should never be conceived just in 
the empirical sense, that is, a geographical part on the planet. Rather, one 
should pay more attention to the transcendental sense. Since Husserl himself 
has made the distinction between Europe in the spiritual sense and the empiri-
cal sense19, not a few followers have welcomed such a distinction and sug-
gested to understand Europe by transcendental sense. The Eurocentrism is 
seen be undermined through such a distinction20. But in the eyes of a non-
European, it is an undeniable fact that the ethical ideals of philosophical ethics 
together with philosophy and science have their birthplace in ancient Greece. 
Even though Europe can be interpreted as transcendental, even though many 
of her ideals have been recognized as universally acceptable, the geographically 
mundane sense of Europe never disappears.  
For example, from the viewpoint of East Asia, Europe remains foreign, it 
 
 
18 Cfr. Davis Zachary, “Husserl on the Ethical Renewal of Sympathy and the One World of Solidar-
ity”, Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XLIII (2005) 561-581. 
19 Idem; cfr. Hua XXVII, p. 241. 
20 H. Reiner Sepp, “Homogenization without Violence? A Phenomenology of Interculturality follow-
ing Husserl”, in Dermot Moran / Lester Embree (eds.), Phenomenology: Critical Concepts in Philosophy, 
New York / London, Routledge, 2004, Vol. IV, pp. 292-299; Toru Tani, “Heimat und das Fremde”, 
Husserl-Studies 9 (1992) 199-216; Klaus Held, “Intercultural Understanding and the Role of Europe, in 
Dermot Moran / Lester Embree (eds.), Phenomenology: Critical Concepts in Philosophy”, New York / 
London, Routledge, 2004, Vol. IV, pp. 267-279. 
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denotes being from outside. This is a fact that can never be dismissed. Sup-
posed one may agree with Husserl that as long as one gets raised to the ethical 
level in the genuine sense, it would become a minor issue to ask who I am or 
who you are in term of culture. In the face of the absolute value of ethics, it is 
more crucial for one to recognize the universal value of ethics than to ask him-
self about his own cultural background. If only everybody can be led to the 
transcendental paradise of the phenomenological, intersubjective world pro-
posed by Husserl! But can any other slogan reveal more triumph of Eurocen-
trism than this? Does it not imply that all non-Europeans are destined to follow 
the guidance of Europeans? 
Such Eurocentric arrogance has always met with resistance. One needs not 
even to point it out from the side of non-European. Where there is the voice of 
interculturality, there is severe criticism on Eurocentrism. No culture has ever 
developed its own cultural ideal on its own. Europe has learned much from 
other areas since ancient times. Ancient Greece is no exception21. How can one 
hold to the Eurocentric position in face of such historical facts? Also cultural 
identity has been questioned in the eyes of the upholders of interculturality. Not 
only every culture learns from other cultures, it is even vital for each culture to 
respond to the culture from outside. A culture without challenge would become 
enclosed culture, which repeats only what it has achieved22. To sum up, no cul-
ture is not comprised of interculturality, such a fact holds good also for Europe. 
However, the historical experience since last two centuries teaches that 
more European elements flow to the non-European than in reverse. As a result, 
interculturality takes place in a very unbalanced way. While the Europeans or 
the Westerners may be pleased to integrate the exotic elements to their cul-
ture, the non-Westerners learn as much as they can from the West mostly for 
the sake of struggle for survival. Again and again the non-Europeans have to 
concede to the Europeans their superiority. 
Whatever the interpretation of intercultural relationship may be, the non-
European have to acknowledge that they live in an unbalanced cultural situa-
tion. Cultural mixture makes up the everyday life of almost all non-Europeans. 
 
 
21 Elmar Holenstein, Kulturphilosophische Perspektiven, Frankfurt / M. Suhrkamp, 1998, pp. 233 
and 236. 
22 Bernhard Waldenfels, “Verschränkung von Heimwelt und Lebenswelt”, in R. A. Mall / Dieter Loh-
mar (Hrsg.), Philosophische Grundlage der Interkulturalität, Amsterdam, Rodopi, 1993, p. 64. 
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Relating this situation to the aforementioned dilemma, we may like to know 
how we should react to such a miserable situation.  
My suggestion is that why non-Europeans should not conceive of such a 
situation as the chance for transformation of their own cultural traditions. No 
non-European culture has turned to genuine European culture only because 
they imitate the European culture. They remain who they are no matter how 
much they are influenced by Europeans. By the way, resuming the transcen-
dental sense of Europe such as we mentioned before, one can say that granted 
Europe can be understood transcendentally, her individuality of mundane exis-
tence never disappears.  
Similar to the relationship between transcendental subjectivity and mun-
dane subjectivity (or person, as Husserl also puts it), Europe should never be 
conceived only in her transcendental aspect. In a word, the empirical, cultural 
aspect of Europe should be always respected. So should every non-European 
culture. As a result, no matter how much the non-European cultures have 
learned from European culture, no matter how they have been influenced by 
the Europeans, the impact from outside, from Europe, should be considered an 
opportunity to transform their own traditions. To speak in the framework of 
Husserl’s ethical project, it is the chance to raise their cultures to a newer, 
higher degree. Through this way they have enriched their own cultures, rather 
than becoming just duplication of European culture.  
In my view, this is exactly what one should see in the relationship between 
Europe and non-Europe. No matter how the non-European culture has to put up 
with the unbalanced cultural situation, it is in the challenge from Europe that 
they get the opportunity to renew their own tradition. Seen in this way, the 
people in the non-European world no longer have reason to find only remorse in 
what they have lost in the past, but rather delight at what they have got as well 
as what they will continue to get in the future. 
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